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THE CONTEXT AND CHALLENGES 
FOR CANADA’S MID-SIZED CITIES†
Almos T. Tassonyi‡
SUMMARY 
All Canadian cities face fiscal and governance problems unique to their 
individual sizes, economies, housing situations and population demographics. 
This paper examines how mid-sized cities, with populations between 300,000 
and two million, can strive to innovate, to act autonomously and to implement 
complex policies and programs within larger constraints — capabilities of which 
other levels of government need to be more cognizant. Yet, while provincial 
and federal regulations would seem to often block mid-sized cities’ capabilities 
for policy-making, they also offer a solid basis from which to operate. Property 
taxes provide stable revenue sources while constraints on borrowing mean 
protection for cities’ credit ratings along with access to capital markets. The 
challenge is forging a workable balance between constraint from without and a 
move toward autonomy from within.
 Municipal governments in Canada typically maintain balanced budgets, but they 
are also subject to restraints on transfer payments imposed by their provincial 
governments. How the cities then allocate that money is determined by various 
factors. These include whether they have large populations of immigrants or the 
elderly to serve, the basis for the local economy — such as whether it is fuelled 
by resources, manufacturing or service industries — the degree of homelessness, 
relationships with public-sector unions, and the costs of compliance to federal 
standards for such things as wastewater. Unfunded liabilities may also put 
pressure on a city’s payroll and create an actuarial deficit for its pension plans, 
resulting in tighter provincial scrutiny.
A city’s fiscal health can be assessed by the ways in which it meets the basic 
criteria of sustainability, flexibility and vulnerability. Sustainability measures how 
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well a municipality maintains its financial obligations to creditors and the public via the 
services it provides. Flexibility entails how much it can increase its levels of debt and taxes, 
while vulnerability reflects the way the city is affected by provincial limits on transfer 
payments and outside factors beyond its control that influence its economy.
Cities do have room to innovate within their provincial and economic constraints, 
however. They can move away from their reliance on property tax revenue by shifting 
to alternatives such as a greater reliance on user fees or they can piggy-back on taxes 
imposed by other levels of government where these are permitted. Many of these options 
have yet to be explored.
Ironically, while the municipal level of government is viewed as being at the bottom of 
the hierarchy of governments, many city governments are larger, more innovative and 
more versatile than the provincial governments that oversee them. Municipal officials 
have as much expertise in policy-making as do their provincial counterparts. In fact, 
own-source revenues, such as user fees, licensing and investments in many large cities 
amount to 90 per cent of operating monies, making those cities less dependent upon 
which way the provincial wind is blowing when it comes to transfer payments. They thus 
have more room to innovate and to develop programs specific to their demographics 
and to the area’s economic health.
It falls upon provincial and federal governments to recognize what municipalities are 
capable of achieving, and to make appropriate legislative and regulatory changes that 
will permit more innovation and policy-making locally. Loosening the constraints under 
which cities operate will create the environment for further improvement and innovation 
in Canada’s municipal governments.
1INTRODUCTION
Today, Canada is over 80 per cent urbanized and Canadian cities face issues that are 
changing the way they govern, provide services and finance their operations. Urban Canada 
is facing pressures in building and maintaining public infrastructure and other services. 
Informed public policy is at the centre of urban Canada’s evolving role as it responds to 
these new pressures and responsibilities.
Urban policy research has traditionally focused on large metropolitan areas, such as New 
York, London and Toronto, cities with more than five million in population. Less attention 
has been paid to mid-sized cities, such as Calgary, Kitchener-Waterloo and Halifax. 
The purpose of this paper is to characterize the mid-sized cities in Canada in terms of 
population growth, demographics, economic activity, housing market conditions and public 
finances, and to determine whether the characteristics and policy issues at this scale of city 
are markedly different from larger and smaller cities.
The paper begins with a statistical profile of Canada’s mid-sized cities using Census 
Metropolitan Area (CMA) data. We then examine some of the challenges that mid-sized 
cities face especially with regard to tax revenues and debt. We conclude that mid-sized 
cities have the capacity to cope with challenges but this capacity needs to be strengthened.
CHARACTERISTICS OF CANADA’S MID-SIZED CITIES
We define Canada’s mid-sized cities as those with populations under two million and over 
300,000, based on Statistics Canada’s definition of mid-sized CMAs. The boundaries of 
the CMAs do not correspond with political jurisdictions that have the power to tax, borrow 
and spend as well as providing different levels of service. For example, the Toronto CMA 
includes in addition to Toronto, the Peel, York and Halton regions, excluding Burlington, 
four municipalities north of the Greater Toronto Area (GTA), and Pickering and Ajax 
(Durham Region). However, the CMA data are the main source for comparing urban areas 
and the cities they contain across Canada. The following sections of the paper also show 
the age composition and dependency ratios, estimates of gross domestic product, median 
family income, occupational data, residential housing values and other socio-economic 
characteristics of Canada’s mid-sized metropolitan areas.
Table 1 shows the 14 mid-sized CMAs with their population growth from 2001 to 2015. 
To facilitate comparisons, the CMA data for Canada’s large cities —Toronto, Montreal 
and Vancouver — are also shown. There are also 16 CMAs with populations of less than 
300,000 and greater than 100,000 in 2015 that we characterize as the small CMAs.
Population
The mid-sized CMAs with the fastest population growth rates between 2001 to 2015 were 
Calgary (47.2 per cent), Edmonton (over 41.7 per cent), Saskatoon (32 per cent) and in the 
GTA. Mississauga and Brampton are included in the Toronto CMA but face challenges 
similar to other mid-sized CMAs. The slowest population growth rates among the mid-
sized cities occurred in southern and southwestern Ontario, where the manufacturing 
industry is based. The average population growth in the mid-sized CMAs over this period 
2was 22.3 per cent, which was only slightly higher than the population growth in the three 
largest CMAs, of 21.0 per cent. In contrast, the population growth in the 14 small CMAs 
was only 14.0 per cent and the population actually declined in Saguenay and Thunder Bay 
where the regional economies have suffered adversity in forest-based industries.
TABLE 1 CENSUS METROPOLITAN AREAS (CMAS) POPULATIONS 
2001 2005 2009 2015 % change 2001-2015
Large CMAs
Toronto 4,882,782 5,250,038 5,636,790 6,129,934 25.5
Montreal 3,532,719 3,655,782 3,816,662 4,060,692 14.9
Vancouver 2,074,543 2,160,228 2,336,179 2,504,340 20.7
Total 10,490,044 11,066,048 11,789,631 12,694,966 21.0
Mid-Sized CMAs
Calgary 977,834 1,087,742 1,222,491 1,439,756 47.2
Edmonton 962,323 1,042,464 1,157,200 1,336,277 41.7
Ottawa-Gatineau 1,110,344 1,157,925 1,219,765 1,332,001 20.0
Quebec City 703,960 718,419 745,741 806,359 14.5
Winnipeg 695,868 713,101 741,807 793,428 14.0
Hamilton 689,072 713,527 734,316 771,703 12.0
Kitchener-Cambridge-Waterloo 431,599 463,494 486,937 511,319 18.5
London 453,092 472,471 487,933 506,418 11.8
Halifax 369.265 381,853 398,167 417,847 13.2
St. Catharines-Niagara 391,875 402,533 403,521 408,222 4.2
Oshawa 308,599 337,747 359,266 388,956 26.0
Victoria 325,765 336,816 354,310 365,291 12.1
Windsor 320,946 335,395 331,065 335,787 4.6
Saskatoon 231,077 238,640 258,107 304,975 32.0
Total 7,971,579 8,402,127 8,900,626 9,745,339 22.3
Sources: Cansim-381-5000 Ontario Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing, Financial Information Returns.
International migration was responsible for just over two-thirds of the CMAs’ population 
growth in 2013/2014. All CMAs with over one million inhabitants reported growth rates 
from international migration of 1.0 per cent or higher, accounting for 71 per cent of 
their growth. In absolute numbers, the Toronto CMA continued to post the highest net 
international migration with an increase of 79,500 people, or 31 per cent of the total for 
Canada. Interprovincial migration is the key driver of the growth of Alberta’s CMAs. In 28 
of 34 CMAs, net interprovincial migration was zero or negative in 2013/2014. The CMAs of 
Calgary and Edmonton recorded the highest interprovincial migration growth rates (+1.0 per 
cent each), which contributed to their strong population growth. Intraprovincial migration 
is behind the growth in smaller CMAs and the declines in the largest ones. In 87 per cent of 
CMAs with a population of 500,000 or less, intraprovincial migration exchanges contributed 
to population growth. Barrie and Oshawa, just outside the Toronto CMA, recorded the 
highest intraprovincial migration growth rates (+1.0 per cent each). Toronto, Montreal and 
Vancouver were the only ones to experience losses in net intraprovincial migration. 
3Age Composition
From a policy perspective, the age composition and the dependency ratio — the ratio of the 
population under 15 and over 65 years to the 15- to 65-year-olds — are important indicators 
that can identify potential pressure for certain types of municipal services. On July 1, 2014, 
the median age of the population residing in a CMA was 39.2 years, compared with 43.6 
for the non-CMA population, indicating that Canada’s rural population is older than its 
urban population. Figure 1 shows that average percentages of the populations aged zero to 
14 years, 15-65 years, and 65 and older in the large, medium and small CMAs in 2015 were 
similar with a slightly higher dependency ratio in the small CMAs (32.5 per cent) compared 
to the mid-sized CMAs (31.3 per cent) and the large CMAs (30.4 per cent). Among the mid-
sized CMAs, Calgary had the lowest dependency ratio, (28.2 per cent), and Quebec (33.0 per 
cent) and St. Catharines-Niagara (34.8 per cent) had the highest. Over the past decade, the 
proportion of persons aged 65 years and older increased in every CMA except Saskatoon, 
where it was stable (11.7 per cent). The largest increases were in Saguenay (5.3 percentage 
points) and Trois-Rivières (5.1 percentage points) which also had the highest dependency 
ratio, 34.9 per cent. The faster pace of population aging in these two CMAs was due, among 
other things, to the stronger postwar baby boom in Quebec as well as repeated losses of 
persons aged 20 to 29 as a result of internal migration. (Statistics Canada, 2015). 
FIGURE 1 THE AGE COMPOSITION AND DEPENDENCY RATIOS IN THE CMAS IN 2015
Source: See Tassonyi (2017, Tables 3 and 4).
Gross Domestic Product
A recent Statistics Canada report provided experimental estimates of the GDP generated 
in Canada’s CMAs. GDP per capita is a measure of the value of output per person living 
in a metropolitan area.1 It depends on labour productivity, average hours worked, the 
employment rate and the working-age population. A key caveat pertaining to this measure 
is that metropolitan GDP is a measure of where output takes place, but it does not take 
1 
DP/POP≡GDP/Hours X Hours/Employment X Employment/POP15-65 X POP15-65/POP 
4into account where workers live. Thus, if a significant portion of a CMA’s working-age 
population is employed outside its CMA of residence, the ratio of employment to working-
age population will be lower and so will the GDP per capita. This is the case of Oshawa. 
In 2009, the average GDP per capita in the mid-sized CMAs was $44,376, slightly below 
the average of $44,762 in the three large CMAs, and exceeding the average of $39,640 in 
the small CMAs. Among the mid-sized CMAs, the GDP per capita ranged from $61,245 
in Calgary to $28,918 in Oshawa, where the nominal GDP per capita fell by 23 per cent 
between 2001 and 2009. See Tassonyi (2017, Tables 5 and 6). The fastest average per capita 
GDP growth was recorded in the small CMAs at 37.2 per cent, compared to 26.5 per cent in 
the large CMAs and 29.3 per cent in the mid-sized CMAs, where Saskatoon (61.0 per cent), 
Victoria (52.6 per cent) and Edmonton (48.5 per cent) experienced the most rapid economic 
growth. Among the smaller CMAs, Regina and St. John’s had the most rapid economic 
growth rates from 2001 to 2009, reflecting the natural resource boom of this period, while 
Guelph and Brantford had the lowest growth rates, reflecting the weakness of southern 
Ontario’s manufacturing-based CMAs. 
The GDP per capita estimates also reflect the shift in the Canadian economy with the 
growth rates for the western CMAs, in particular from 2001 to 2009, significantly above 
average, while the CMAs where manufacturing and industry have been the historic basis of 
the community’s economy have had relatively weaker growth in output per capita. This is 
particularly marked when the percentage growth over the whole decade is compared to the 
growth pattern from 2005 to 2009. The level of variation increases significantly given the 
poor performance of southern Ontario’s economy. This gap is also apparent in some of the 
municipally specific fiscal indicators discussed in a later section of the paper.
Median Family Incomes
Figure 2 provides an alternative perspective on the economic differences among the mid-
sized CMAs, with median family incomes in 2011 varying widely from $109,700 in Calgary 
to $68,700 in London. There were also significant regional differences in the income 
growth rates with declines in inflation-adjusted median family income in southern Ontario 
in Windsor (-13.0 per cent), London (-10.5 per cent) and Hamilton (-5.7 per cent) from 2001 
to 2011, in contrast to the significant growth in western metropolitan areas, with increases 
of 44.1 per cent in Saskatoon, 28.2 per cent in Calgary and 15.8 per cent in Winnipeg. The 
stagnation and decline in family incomes in this period in many southern Ontario cities 
raise the question whether this weakness is also reflected in the fiscal characteristics of the 
narrower political jurisdictions shown and discussed later in this paper.
5FIGURE 2 MEDIAN FAMILY INCOMES IN 2011 IN MID-SIZED CMAS
Source: See Tassonyi (2017, Table 7)
Occupational Structure
Concentration of employment in a sector may make a region’s economy more volatile in 
response to changes in international markets and technology. To compare the degree to 
which employment is more or less concentrated in 10 occupational groups in these CMAs, 
we have calculated the Herfindahl index of employment concentration. The Herfindahl 
index is scaled so that it varies between zero and one.2 The index is zero if each occupation 
had an equal share of employment, i.e., complete diversification of employment, and one if 
one occupation accounted for all of the employment in a CMA. Canada’s large CMAs have 
very similar levels of employment concentration, while the degree among the mid-sized 
and small CMAs varies quite widely. For example, the Kitchener-Cambridge-Waterloo, 
Guelph and Sherbrooke CMAs have the least concentrated, or most diverse, employment 
concentrations, while the St. Catharines-Niagara, Moncton and Saint John CMAs have 
the most concentrated occupational structures. While the Saint John CMA has a relatively 
high level of concentration in two areas — business and finance administration, and 
sales and service — St. Catharines-Niagara and Moncton’s occupational structures are 
marked by the high level of employment in sales and services, reflecting the tourism 
industry for the former and the regional hub for the latter. Calgary’s occupational structure 
is less concentrated than in Toronto, Montreal or Vancouver while Edmonton’s overall 
occupational structure is similar to that of the three big cities. Figure 3 also indicates 
there is no connection between the population of a CMA and the degree of employment 
concentration. However, the concentration of employment in the service industry in the 
2 
The formula for the Herfindahl index is  where N is the number of occupations, and sj, is the 
share of employment in occupation j.
6Niagara area may serve as part of an explanation for the relatively low level of family 
income in that region.3 
FIGURE 3 THE DIVERSITY OF EMPLOYMENT BY OCCUPATION IN CANADIAN CMAS IN 2011
Source: See (Tassonyi, 2017, Table 9) and author’s calculations.
Housing
The housing market also reflects economic conditions and population changes, and the 
level and growth in residential property values is an important underpinning of municipal 
property taxes. Figure 4 shows that per capita residential property values varied widely 
within the large and the mid-sized CMAs. For example, Vancouver’s per capita residential 
property values were more than twice those of Montreal and Victoria’s per capita residential 
property values were 2.7 times those in Windsor.
Clearly, housing affordability is not a problem in all cities but it has emerged as an issue in 
Toronto, Vancouver, Calgary, Victoria and other western cities.4 It is argued that the root 
cause of the affordability problem is that there are simply too many low-income households 
in Canada. Further, market and institutional imperfections, including property tax biases 
against multi-residential rentals, the design of the rent control system, a lack of available 
land in reasonable cost locations and low-density zoning regulations that prevent low-cost 
construction, have all contributed to create disincentives to denser, heterogeneous and 
affordable housing. In some municipalities, peculiarly designed development charges have 
also enhanced the level of disincentives. (TD Economics, 2015, Crowley and Speer 2016 
and Amborski 2016) 
3 
Hospitality and tourism in the Niagara CMA have been defined as a strong cluster relative to other North American clusters. 
See Institute for Competitiveness and Prosperity (2016, 19).
4 
See Tassonyi (2017, Table 15) for the RBC Housing Affordability Measures for selected Canadian cities. The index shows 
the proportion of median pre-tax household income that would be required to service the cost of mortgage payments 
(principal and interest), property taxes and utilities based on the average market price for single-family detached homes and 
condo apartments.
7FIGURE 4 PER CAPITA RESIDENTIAL PROPERTY VALUES IN LARGE AND MID-SIZED CMAS IN 2013
Source: See Tassonyi (2017, Table 13)
MAJOR CHALLENGES
Glaeser (2012) notes three central features in the United States that make urban public 
finance distinctly different from national or state finances. These include the preponderant 
role of the property tax in revenues, the role of intergovernmental transfers, and that local 
governments typically maintain relatively balanced budgets. Each of these is also a defining 
characteristic of municipal finance in Canada. To the extent that they are also constraints 
on the municipal fisc, there are potential policy implications for municipalities in terms of 
dealing with issues that are likely to confront cities in the near future.
The potential for a perfect storm of policy challenges exists for municipalities in general 
and medium-sized cities in particular. These challenges include both short- and long-run 
factors. In the short run, (hopefully), fiscal weakness at the provincial level is likely to 
constrain the provinces’ ability to maintain current levels of intergovernmental transfers. 
In a series of papers, Ron Kneebone and various co-authors have identified weaknesses in 
current provincial fiscal health (Kneebone and Wilkins, 2014).
On the expenditure side, in the long run, increases in the dependency ratio consequent 
on the aging population are common to mid-sized cities and CMAs in eastern Canada 
(FCM 2013). Common to all of these jurisdictions are social issues such as homelessness, 
the aging population and income inequality. The last poses issues for the location 
and enhancement of transit and municipal services such as daycares and community 
centres. Salary arbitration for police and emergency services also poses issues for some 
municipalities’ wage bills.
In a related vein, the Federation of Canadian Municipalities’ (FCM) pre-budget consultation 
document (FCM 2015) identified the pressure for investment that compliance with federal 
8regulation of wastewater standards will entail.5 On the revenue side, restructuring the 
economy away from property-based commercial and industrial real estate has resulted in 
assessment loss. This has been noteworthy in southern Ontario mid-sized cities but is also 
apparent in Quebec. Whether this is clearly related to the business property tax burden 
analyzed by Found and Tomlinson (2012) and with Ben Dachis (2013) or is related to 
broader global trends is open to discussion. Among the alternatives that may reduce that 
source of pressure is a local business value-added tax (BVT) (Bird 2014). Bird explores 
the genesis and the possibilities of shifting tax from the real property base to a locally 
determined business value tax. A recent study by Kitchen and Slack (2016) surveys the 
alternative tax sources for municipalities with discussions of potential pitfalls. They suggest 
that piggy-backing on the taxes imposed by other levels of government may be the most 
tenable solution.6 By contrast, it is not entirely resolved as to whether there is tax room in 
the property tax field.7
Financial Condition and Fiscal Health
Financial condition refers to a municipality’s ability to meet all of its financial obligations.8 
The Public Sector Accounting Board (PSAB) describes three interrelated characteristics of 
the fiscal condition of governments: sustainability, flexibility and vulnerability.9 
Sustainability is the degree to which a government can maintain its financial obligations 
with respect to service commitments to the public and its financial commitments to 
creditors and employees without increasing the relative tax and debt burdens in the 
economy.10 Perennial operating deficits or a trend of an increasing share of debt charges in 
current revenues suggest an unsustainable fiscal condition. For local governments, the ratio 
of outstanding debt to annual revenue provides an indication of the future revenue that may 
be encumbered to finance past spending.11 
Flexibility or revenue capacity is the degree to which a government can increase the 
relative levels of debt or taxes to meet existing financial obligations both in respect of its 
service commitments to the public and financial commitments to creditors, employees and 
others. For local governments, the ratio of public debt charges (debt service) to own-source 
revenues is an indicator of flexibility in spending.12 An increase in this indicator over an 
extended period of time during a period of relatively stable interest rates means that the 
government has consistently chosen borrowing over increases in taxation or user fees to 
meet its financial and service commitments. Increasing borrowing will eventually affect 
5 
For further discussion, see Tassonyi and Conger (2015, 10).
6 
See Kitchen and Slack (2016, 17) for a discussion of the issues that might preclude piggy-backing in provinces with an HST.
7 
Among others, see Tassonyi, Bird and Slack (2015), McMillan and Dahlby (2014) and Clayton (2017).
8 
Other definitions take a longer-term approach by also including a government’s ability to continue to meet its obligations 
over time (Sohl et al., 2009).
9 
The Public Sector Accounting Board is a board of the Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants. In Ontario, municipal 
accounts must conform to the general accounting principles established by PSAB. Similar indicators were used as measures 
of municipal fiscal health in Tassonyi (2011) and Reinhart and Rogoff (2009). These indicators are also used with respect to 
sovereign borrowers. For a more detailed discussion of the PSAB methodology, see Bird (2015).
10 
PSAB (2007, 6). 
11 
PSAB (2007, 10).
12 
PSAB (2007, 11).
9flexibility, assuming that debt service takes priority over other mandatory expenditure 
commitments.13 Flexibility is also captured by the debt to assessment ratio as a rise in this 
ratio impairs municipal fiscal capacity either through a reduction in the tax base or an 
increase in mandatory expenditure resulting from increased indebtedness. With respect to 
taxes, the ratio of own-source revenues to taxable assessment is commonly used. A change 
in taxable assessment or its growth rate relative to own-source revenues could influence a 
municipality’s flexibility (PSAB 2007).14 
Last, the degree of vulnerability of a local government can be a function of either transfer 
dependency or the risks created by exogenous shocks that impact its tax base. Transfer 
dependency is usually measured by the ratio of transfers to total revenues.
REVENUES
Property taxes are commonly municipalities’ main own-revenue source although 
dependence on them varies widely as indicated in Figure 5. Note that all of the mid-sized 
Ontario municipalities rely on property taxes for more than 60 per cent of their own-source 
revenues while Saskatoon, Edmonton and Calgary are somewhat less reliant on property 
taxes. In these municipalities, access to significant user fees, licensing and investment 
revenue accounts for the somewhat lesser importance of this form of taxation.15 Own-source 
revenues as a per cent of operating revenues are generally close to 90 per cent or above in 
the largest municipalities with the exception of Ontario’s cities, where operating transfers 
largely for social assistance reflect the mandatory cost-sharing between the two levels of 
government. Operating transfers as a percentage of operating revenues are a measure of the 
transfer dependency of municipal governments. As shown in Table A in the data appendix, 
operating transfers in the Ontario regional governments were generally higher than for the 
municipalities in other provinces, averaging between 20- to 25 per cent from 2011 to 2015, 
as that level of government has the responsibility for providing social assistance.
13 
“Failing to do so would impair its future ability to borrow or to roll over its existing debt.” (PSAB, 2007, 11). Also sub-
national governments do not control monetary policy, precluding using inflation as an alternative to debt service.
14 
Although household income may be a better measure of flexibility, the data are not generally available on an annual basis.
15 
For example, Saskatoon’s consolidated revenue numbers include its electrical utility operation as noted by Vander Ploeg 
(2013).
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FIGURE 5 PROPERTY TAXES AS A PERCENTAGE OF OWN-SOURCE REVENUES IN 2015
Source: See Tassonyi (2017, Table 16)
Capital Finance
Three commonly used ratios to compare municipal capital finance are the ratio of capital 
to operating expenditures, debt charges (including principal and interest) to own-source 
revenue and the ratio of debt to tax revenues. The capital/operating ratio provides an 
indication of the importance of infrastructure or tangible capital acquisition relative 
to operating expenditures; the debt charges to revenue ratio provides an indication of 
flexibility and the extent to which current revenues are encumbered to finance mandatory 
expenditures. The ratio of debt to tax revenues is an indicator of sustainability. These 
percentages and ratios are shown in figures 6, 7 and 8. In general, western municipalities 
and the growth areas in Ontario had larger capital/operating expenditure ratios in 2015 
and 2011 compared to 2005, reflecting infrastructure pressure. Calgary’s and Edmonton’s 
capital spending has clearly been reduced between 2011 and 2015. The western 
municipalities continue to have capital expenditures significantly greater as a share of 
operating expenditures by comparison to the rest of the country.
11
FIGURE 6  RATIO OF CAPITAL TO OPERATING EXPENDITURES IN 2015
Source: See Tassonyi (2017, Table 19)
FIGURE 7 RATIO OF DEBT CHARGES TO OWN-SOURCE REVENUES IN 2015
Source: See Tassonyi (2017, Table 19)
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FIGURE 8 RATIO OF DEBT TO TAX REVENUES IN 2015
Source: See Tassonyi (2017, Table 19)
Looking at the ratio of debt charges to own-source revenues in Figure 7, most provinces 
use a standard of 20- to 35 per cent as the maximum limit that debt service is permitted 
to be of own-source revenues or an assessment-based criteria. The data for 2011 and 2015 
show that municipalities are well below this rule-of -thumb. The coefficient of variation fell 
significantly with reductions in Montreal and Quebec City despite the increased importance 
of debt service in Calgary and Edmonton.
While the debt charges to own-source revenue ratios for Montreal and Quebec City may 
seem large compared to the other cities, Meloche, Strub and Vaillancourt (2015) noted that 
the total amount of bonds issued by Quebec municipalities was more than $3,000 per capita 
in 2008, in contrast to less than $1,000 in most other provinces, including Ontario. Indeed, 
in 2009, 52 per cent of Quebec’s municipal investments were financed by borrowing. 
Quebec municipalities had in 2008 issued 49.4 per cent of the stock of municipal bonds 
in Canada, while Ontario is responsible for 20.1 per cent of municipal bonds issued. 
Consequently, debt service is consuming a larger share of expenditures for Quebec 
municipalities, 15.5 per cent compared to 10.4 per cent for the government of Quebec. 
This burden makes Quebec municipalities more vulnerable to interest rate variations. The 
availability of infrastructure transfers may help reduce this exposure to debt.
Unfunded liabilities are an unexplored source of pressure. Meloche, Strub and Vaillancourt 
(2015) identify both pressure on payrolls and an actuarial deficit in pension plans as sources 
of risk for the aggregate of Quebec municipalities. They note a deficit estimated at $4.7 
billion in 2011 with a significant increase having taken place in the course of that year. 
The magnitude of the actuarial deficit in their view calls for structural solutions as these 
schemes are based on dated criteria (132). Some provinces have tightened the rules on 
funding and reporting pension and benefit liabilities.
13
The ratio of debt to tax revenues increased in most municipalities from 2005 to 2011 and 
then fell in 2015.16 This ratio suggests that many municipalities have been reducing their 
outstanding debt and not increasing indebtedness through more borrowing. Windsor’s 
increase reflects the continuing weakness of its local tax base. The coefficient of variation 
of the debt/tax ratio for this sample of large and mid-sized cities has also fallen which 
suggests more conservative borrowing practices throughout the country.
CONCLUDING COMMENTS: THE MUNICIPAL CAPACITY TO COPE
“The tendency to equal treatment also ignores the fact that local authorities in cities and 
city-regions manage local administrations that are larger than some provincial governments 
and have in place robust financial controls and accountability regimes, as well as the policy-
making expertise to develop programs in complex areas. In short, they have far greater 
capacity for autonomy and innovation, and this capacity should be recognized by provincial 
governments.” (Côté and Fenn (2014, 24) 
One of the difficulties in the urban policy agenda is drawing the lines between the socio-
economic characteristics of metropolitan areas and the fiscal aspects of the predominant 
political jurisdictions that affect the socio-economic development of those regions. This 
paper sets out some comparative indicators of both socio-economic and fiscal indicators 
of Canada’s mid-sized metropolitan areas that will help to provoke further thinking and 
research on the nature of the linkages between the measurable activities of governments 
and the broader economy.
Whether they are creatures or a third order of government, the policy environment for 
mid-sized cities is challenging. In some ways, the seeming constraints placed on their fiscal 
manoeuvrability have proven to be a blessing in disguise. Dependence on property taxation 
has provided revenue stability while constraints on borrowing have preserved credit 
ratings and access to capital markets. Municipalities are continuing to develop innovative 
ways of delivering services and are implementing new technologies which may permit 
better pricing of services as well as delivery improvements. It remains to be seen whether 
provincial and federal governments are willing to make the appropriate legislative and 
regulatory changes to allow more innovation at the local level, thereby setting the stage for 
further improvements in Canada’s urban landscape.
16 
See Tassonyi (2017, Table 19). For a recent estimate of the borrowing capacity of Canadian municipalities, see Tassonyi and 
Conger (2015) 18-19.
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APPENDIX ON CMA DATA
The concept of the CMA is based on the measurement of commuting flows. However, it 
poses issues, given the lack of congruence with political jurisdictions that have the power 
to tax, borrow and spend as well as providing different levels of service. For example, the 
Toronto CMA includes in addition to Toronto, the Peel, York and Halton regions, excluding 
Burlington, four municipalities north of the GTA, and Pickering and Ajax (Durham 
Region). Furthermore, many mid-sized cities in Ontario are in a two-tier municipal 
structure (for example, Brampton and Mississauga and Markham and Vaughan) and some 
of the regional municipalities (upper tiers) would meet the population criteria while many 
of their constituent lower-tier municipalities are smaller in terms of population, such as the 
regions of Durham, Halton and Waterloo.
Similar issues arise from the overlapping boundaries of the Montreal CMA, the 
Communauté métropolitaine de Montréal, the Montreal Agglomeration Council and 
the separate municipalities including the City of Montreal itself, Longueuil and Laval 
(Lafortune and Collin, 2011). Ottawa-Gatineau straddles provincial boundaries with very 
different powers and responsibilities within its boundaries. This lack of congruence is 
particularly the case for the three largest CMAs.
In general, mid-sized cities are single-tier or stand-alone political entities, although they 
may be the dominant presence in regional service and financing arrangements. Some form 
part of the area under a regional government’s jurisdiction with wide powers to set taxation 
parameters, borrow in capital markets and be responsible for the provision of services that 
usually have significant spill-over effects. The regional municipalities have preponderant 
taxing powers and spending responsibilities in significant policy areas including 
environmental, policing, social services and transportation as well as exclusive powers to 
borrow. They also have the responsibility to develop regional land use plans consistent with 
provincial planning guidelines. All of these far outweigh lower-tier responsibilities for the 
most part. In all of these areas, there are complications in split responsibilities for significant 
services including land use planning, and transportation and environmental services.
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